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Abstract
Welfare programs are important for reducing poverty but create incentives for recipients
to maximize their income by either reducing labor supply or manipulating taxable income.
In this paper, we quantify the extent of such behavioral responses for the Earned Income
Tax Credit (EITC) in the US. We exploit that US states can set top-up rates, which means
that, at a given point in time, workers with the same income receive diﬀerent tax refunds in
diﬀerent states. Using event studies as well as a border pair design, we document that a raise
in the state-EITC leads to more bunching of self-employed tax ﬁlers at the ﬁrst kink point
of the tax schedule. While we document a strong relationship up until the Great Recession
in 2007, we ﬁnd no eﬀect thereafter. These ﬁndings point to important behavioral responses
to what is the largest welfare program in the US.
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1 Introduction
Assessing the responsiveness of individuals to policy changes is of key importance for the (opti-
mal) design of tax-beneﬁt systems and for predicting the eﬀects of policy reforms. Labor supply
and taxable income responses have been studied extensively in the literature (see, e.g., Blundell
and MaCurdy (1999), Meghir and Phillips (2008), Keane (2011), Saez et al. (2010) and Bargain
and Peichl (2016) for surveys). An important insight of this literature is that welfare programs
aimed at reducing poverty can trigger behavioral responses from recipients, who can maximize
their welfare receipt by reducing labor supply or manipulating their taxable income. Because
some responses  especially income manipulation  are costly to the taxpayer, eﬀective policy
design requires knowledge of the strength of these responses. One way to measure such be-
havioral responses is the degree of bunching at eligibility thresholds or kink points in the tax
schedule (Saez, 2010; Chetty et al., 2013; Bastani and Seli, 2014).
In this paper, we document and quantify behavioral responses for the Earned Income Tax
Credit (EITC), the largest welfare program in the United States. We exploit the discretion of
each state in topping up the federal EITC, whereby recipients with the same taxable income
receive higher tax refunds in some states than in others, leading to substantial variation in top-
up rates across states and over time. Using event studies and a border pair design, we analyze
to what extent tax ﬁlers manipulate their taxable income in response to a change in the state
top-up rate. To measure income manipulation, we use data by Chetty et al. (2013) on the share
of self-employed tax ﬁlers within a county who bunch around the ﬁrst kink point of the EITC
schedule.
In theory, one would expect that higher top-up rates lead to more bunching at the kink
point because they give income manipulation a higher pay-oﬀ. Figure 1, which illustrates the
main ﬁnding of our analysis, suggests that the theory is conﬁrmed by the data. Here we compare
counties located at a state border in a state with a raise in the top-up rate to control counties
on the other side of the border, located in states without a raise. After taking out time trends,
bunching in both groups follows a similar pattern before the raise but diverges thereafter. In
states without a raise, it follows the same downward trend, while in states with a raise, bunching
signiﬁcantly increases after the raise.
While this ﬁgure provides prima facie evidence of a signiﬁcant behavioral response, there
are several endogeneity concerns that prevent us from interpreting this relationship as causal.
One important concern is that states set top-up rates with behavioral responses in mind. A
state that expects a strong response may be reluctant to raise the top-up than a state that
expects no or very little response. Alternatively, as shown by Neumark and Williams (2016),
states may raise the top-up rate to encourage people to participate in the federal EITC, thereby
increasing the inﬂow of federal EITC dollars into the state. Using a border pair design with
multiple combinations of ﬁxed eﬀects, we address several important sources of endogeneity. In
this research design, we compare the level of bunching in counties on opposite sides of a state
border. In this setting, tax ﬁlers in treated counties receive for the same income a higher tax
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Figure 1: Bunching of self-employed workers near the kink point in counties with and without
a raise in the top-up rate.
Notes: This ﬁgure compares the level of bunching before and after a raise in the top-up rate in the treatment
counties  located in a state with a raise in t = 0  to that in a neighboring control county located in a state
without a raise. To make the counties comparable across years, year ﬁxed eﬀects and border pair ﬁxed eﬀects
have been controlled for.
refund compared to those living in the control county across the state border.
Our estimates conﬁrm the behavioral responses to a raise in the top-up rate observed in
Figure 1. We consistently ﬁnd a positive eﬀect of the EITC top-up rate on the level of bunching
at the kink point. In our preferred speciﬁcation, an increase in the top-up rate by one within-
county-pair standard deviation leads to an increase in bunching by about 10% of a standard
deviation. To put this result in perspective, suppose that the average top-up rate would be raised
from currently 3 percent by one standard deviation to 10 percent, which would be equivalent
to raising the annual refund from $180 to $570. In this case, our estimates predict an increase
in the degree of bunching by 2.6 percentage points. Across the US, in absolute numbers, this
corresponds to an additional 930,000 EITC claimants, of which 250,000 would additionally bunch
at the kink point.
We also document a change in the response to the EITC top-up rate during the Great
Recession in 2008/09. While we observe a strong positive response up until 2007, we ﬁnd small
and statistically insigniﬁcant eﬀects from 2008 onwards. This result appears to be driven by an
overall higher number of self-employed workers claiming the EITC during the crisis. Because
our outcome variable is the ratio of self-employed whose income is close to the kink point over
all self-employed EITC claimants, the ratio remains unchanged when both the numerator and
denominator are aﬀected by the current economic situation.
Our results suggest that tax ﬁlers signiﬁcantly respond to changes in the EITC schedule by
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manipulating their taxable income, either through changes in labor supply or through incorrect
reporting of income. Moreover, the response in the total number of EITC claimants point to
knowledge eﬀects as well as labor supply responses. Seemingly, when a state introduces a top-up
rate, self-employed people become more aware of the EITC, leading to more people claiming it
as well as more people claiming an amount close to the revenue-maximizing kink point. An
alternative explanation for this eﬀect is that the EITC induces people to shift income from
employment to self-employment, in which case income manipulation is easier.
This paper adds to the growing literature on the economic and social impact of the EITC.1
Several studies show that the EITC substantially improves the lives of low-income families in
the United States. Positive eﬀects are found for example on infant health (Hoynes et al., 2015),
maternal employment (Bastian, 2016), children's education outcomes (Bastian and Michelmore,
2017), the likelihood to get married (Anderberg, 2008; Bastian, 2017), as well as poverty reduc-
tion (Hoynes and Patel, 2015). Other studies emphasize the distortive nature of the EITC by
showing that the kink points in the tax schedule provide an important incentive to manipulate
taxable income to maximize one's tax refund (Saez, 2010; Chetty et al., 2013). This manifests
itself through a visible degree of bunching of taxable incomes around this kink point, although
it remains unclear whether this response is driven by income misreporting or an actual labor
supply response.2 While theses studies have documented and provided a rationale for bunch-
ing at the kink point, the contribution of our paper is to quantify the extent to which income
manipulation responds to changes in the refund rates. Our results are important for assessing
the eﬀectiveness of the EITC and can inform policymakers about potential adverse responses of
future increases in top-up rates.
More broadly, this paper contributes to the literature on behavioral responses to incentives
provided by design features of public policies. A vast literature analyzes labor supply responses,
especially to taxation, and numerous surveys and handbook articles have been written on this
topic.3 However, the variation in the magnitude of labor supply elasticities found in the literature
is substantial (see Evers et al. (2008), Bargain et al. (2014)), and there is little agreement among
economists on the size of the elasticity that should be used in economic policy analyses (Fuchs
et al., 1998). Heim (2007) and Blau and Kahn (2007) show that married women's wage elasticities
have strongly declined over time in the USA. A possible explanation for this ﬁnding is that a
more stable attachment of women to the labor market is responsible for modest participation
1 For surveys, see Hotz and Scholz (2003), Eissa and Hoynes (2006), Meyer (2010) and Nichols and Rothstein
(2016).
2 A key result of the existing literature on labor supply reactions to the EITC is that there are positive
eﬀects at the extensive margin (Eissa and Liebman, 1996; Meyer and Rosenbaum, 2001; Grogger, 2003;
Hotz and Scholz, 2006; Gelber and Mitchell, 2012). The latter result which was found primarily for single
mothers does not hold true for secondary wage earners, for whom Eissa and Hoynes (2004) ﬁnd a decrease
in participation. In contrast to these ﬁndings, previous research suggests that there are none or only small
eﬀects at the intensive margin (Rothstein, 2010; Chetty and Saez, 2013; Lin and Tong, 2017). Using data
from Finland, Harju and Matikka (2016) provide evidence for substantial income shifting among high-wage
earners.
3 See, e.g., Hausman (1985); Pencavel (1986), Killingsworth and Heckman (1986), Heckman (1993), Blundell
and MaCurdy (1999), Meghir and Phillips (2008), Keane (2011), Keane and Rogerson (2012), McClelland
and Mok (2012), Bargain et al. (2014).
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responses to ﬁnancial incentives in the recent period. In addition to labor supply, a more recent
literature has investigated the elasticity of taxable income, following the seminal contributions
by Feldstein (1995, 1999).4 There is also evidence that gross income is less responsive to tax
changes than taxable income (Saez et al. (2010); Kleven and Schultz (2014)). Our paper shows
that such incentives are also at play for the EITC, and tax ﬁlers signiﬁcantly respond to them.
In the remainder of the paper, we ﬁrst provide detailed information on the institutional
background of the EITC (Section 2). In Section 3, we explain how we measure income manipu-
lation, describe the construction of the dataset and present descriptive evidence. In Section 4,
we describe the empirical strategy. In Section 5, we present the main estimation results. Section
6 concludes.
2 Institutional Background
We begin by providing information about the federal EITC and the state-speciﬁc tax credits
(state EITC). We show that EITCs considerably vary across states, such that workers with the
same income receive higher tax refunds in some states than in others. We further describe bunch-
ing at the ﬁrst EITC kink point, our outcome of interest, and provide a theoretical discussion
why one would expect bunching to increase after a raise in the State EITC.
2.1 The EITC
With 26.7 million workers receiving 63 billion dollars per year, The Earned Income Tax Credit
(EITC) is arguably the largest and most important welfare program in the US (Nichols and
Rothstein, 2016). Its aim is to supplement a person's labor income and reduce the income tax
burden of low-wage earners while providing incentives to work. The eligibility for the EITC and
the amount of tax credit depends on the number of children as well as one's taxable income. To
claim the EITC, eligible tax payers have to ﬁle a federal tax return. Their income tax liability is
then reduced by the amount of the EITC. If the tax credit exceeds the tax liability, the taxpayer
receives a tax refund. Taxes are in general paid in the state where the income is earned, although
some states have reciprocity agreements that allow taxpayers to ﬁle their tax returns in their
state of residence (Agrawal and Hoyt, 2016).
Figure 2 illustrates the EITC tax schedule in 2009, the last year in our sample period, for
families with one and two children as a function of annual earned income. The EITC schedule
consists of three parts. In a phase-in region, starting at earnings of zero, the marginal refund
increases with every additional dollar of labor income. At the plateau, for a range of annual
earnings the tax credit remains constant, while it gets phased out above a certain threshold. For
families with one child, for example, the tax credit is phased in at a rate of 34% starting from
the ﬁrst dollar of labor income, and reaches the plateau at an annual income of $8,950. Above
the second kink point at $16,420, the tax credit is phased out at 16%. The maximum tax credit
4 See Meghir and Phillips (2008) and Saez et al. (2010), for surveys, and Dörrenberg et al. (2015) for theory
and evidence.
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Figure 2: The EITC schedule in 2009
Notes: This graph displays the relationship between the tax refund and household labor income according to
the 2009 federal EITC schedule. Tax units with adjusted gross income above the earned income threshold are
not eligibile. First EITC kink point for families with one child: $8,950; for families with two children $12,570.
Second kink point at $16,420.
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for a family with one child is $3,043, which they receive when their annual income lies between
both kink points. If it lies above or below the kink points, the tax credit gets reduced.5 For
workers without children, the maximum tax credit is very small ($457).
2.2 State-speciﬁc tax credits
In our analysis, we exploit the variation in state-speciﬁc top-up rates over time. Besides the
federal EITC, which is common to all eligible workers in the US, each state can decide to top
up the federal tax credit by a certain percentage. As argued by Neumark and Williams (2016),
states have good reasons to top up the EITC. Besides improving the economic situation of poor
families, a higher EITC may increase employment, states need to spend less on unemployment
beneﬁts. In addition, more EITC claimants means that more federal EITC dollars ﬂow into the
state, which may beneﬁt the local economy.
The total tax credit in a given state is computed as
total tax credit = federal EITC × (1 + top-up rate ).
In some states, for example Minnesota and Wisconsin, the top-up rate depends on the number
of children; the top-up is only granted to families with children, or families with children receive
higher top-up rates than singles or childless couples.6 Moreover, some states refund the tax
credit if the tax liability becomes negative while others have a top-up of zero for negative tax
liability. Over the years, the number of states with a top-up rate steadily increased. While in
1996 six states granted a top-up, in 2009, the end of our sample period, it were 20 states. As
shown in Figure 4, the top-up rates considerably vary across states. It is zero in some states
and as high as 40% in the District of Columbia (DC).7
EITC claimants in states with a low top-up rate are granted a signiﬁcantly lower tax credit
compared to claimants with the same pre-tax income in states with a high top-up rate. Figure
3 illustrates the diﬀerence in tax credit for EITC claimants with one child in a state with zero
top-up and a state with a top-up rate of 40 percent. A claimant with an income at the ﬁrst kink
point would receive a tax credit of $3,043 in a state without a top-up, and $4,260 in DC, which
has the highest top-up rate in the US. In both states, the kink points of the EITC schedule
are the same, although the phase-in and phase-out region are steeper in the state with the high
top-up rate. Therefore, in 2009, a family with one child receiving the maximum credit would
receive an additional tax credit of $30 from a one percentage point increase in the top-up rate.
The same family would gain $960 through moving from Cheshire county in New Hampshire
to neighboring Windham county in Vermont. In 2009, New Hampshire and Vermont are the
bordering US states with the largest diﬀerence in top-up rates (32 percentage points).
5 For families with two children, the kink points 2009 are at $12,570 and $16,420. The maximum tax credit
is $5028, which results in steeper phase-in and phase-out regions compared to the schedule for families with
one child.
6 Wisconsin has a top-up rate of zero for childless people, but top-up rates of 4%, 14%, and 43% for families
with one, two, and three and more children, respectively.
7 We are aware that, technically, DC is technically not a state. However, it has its own EITC.
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Figure 3: Tax credit in states with high and low top-up rates
Notes: This ﬁgure displays the EITC schedule for claimants with one child in a state with zero top-up and a
state with a top-up rate of 40 percent in 2009. The vertical lines mark the ﬁrst and the second kink point. Tax
units with adjusted gross income above the earned income threshold are not eligible. Families with unearned
income may be ineligible.
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Figure 4: State-speciﬁc top-up rates in 2009
Notes: This Figure shows the variation in top up rates across states in 2009. Darker colors refer to higher top-up
rates.
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2.3 Bunching as a measure of income manipulation
With its two kink points, the EITC schedule provides incentives for recipients to manipulate their
taxable income. For tax ﬁlers whose income is close to one of the kink points, it is optimal to
manipulate their income to be exactly at the kink point. At the ﬁrst kink point, the marginal tax
credit switches from a high positive value to zero, such that every additional dollar in earnings
above the threshold does not result in higher tax credits. On the other hand, the tax liability
increases with every dollar earned, regardless of the tax credit.8
There are several margins along which EITC claimants can manipulate their taxable In-
come, namely labor supply, income shifting and tax evasion. A legal margin is adjusting one's
labor supply; for example, workers may decide to work fewer hours, thereby decreasing their
annual earnings while increasing their tax refund. Another way to adjust one's labor supply
and manipulate taxable income, especially for self-employed workers, is to smooth the stream of
income over time. For self-employed workers whose income is close the ﬁrst kink point, it could
pay oﬀ to postpone projects to the following year, thereby maximizing the tax credit in the
present year. A further  yet illegal  margin of income manipulation is incorrectly declaring
one's income in the annual tax return.
Such manipulations manifest themselves in a noticeable degree of bunching around the ﬁrst
kink point of the EITC schedule, as documented by Saez (2010) and Chetty et al. (2013). In
the absence of income manipulation, one would expect the income distribution to be smooth.
Instead, however, a large number of EITC claimants report an income that is very close to the
ﬁrst kink point, resulting in a spike in the earnings distribution.
Some groups of workers have a much greater scope for income manipulation than others.
As shown by Saez (2010), pure wage earners  i.e. regularly employed workers  display no
bunching at the kink point, because their taxable income gets directly reported to the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) by their employer, limiting the scope for incorrectly declaring one's
income. In addition, work hours are usually ﬁxed in a work contract, making it diﬃcult to
adjust one's labor supply. Self-employed workers, by contrast, have a much greater scope of
manipulating their taxable income, as they report the taxable income to the ﬁnancial authorities
themselves, and they are free to choose how much they work.9
A raise in the top-up rate provides people with a higher payoﬀ for income manipulation.
Therefore, we would expect bunching to increase following a raise in the top-up rate, although
we would only expect this eﬀect for self-employed tax ﬁlers. Likewise, would not expect any
eﬀect for tax ﬁlers without children, because their federal EITC is very small in the ﬁrst place.
8 For a theory of optimal income transfers with a non-linear tax schedule, see Kaplow (2007).
9 Additional evidence from Denmark by Daniel and Bertel (2013) suggests that half of the bunching response
among self-employed is due to inter-temporal income shifting.
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3 Data and Descriptive Evidence
In this section, we describe the construction of the dataset and provide descriptive statistics
for the main variables. In addition, we produce event study graphs that provide descriptive
evidence on an increase in bunching following a raise in the State EITC.
3.1 Data
We construct our dataset by linking county-level data on tax ﬁling with state-level institutional
data on the EITC, as well as county-level demographic data.
County-level data on tax ﬁling. Our main outcome of interest is the bunching of self-
employed workers around the ﬁrst kink point of the EITC schedule. We use the data compiled
by Chetty et al. (2013) for our analysis. Bunching is measured as the share of self-employed
EITC-claimants in an area whose income falls within a window of $500 around the ﬁrst EITC
kink point. The denominator of this share is the total number of self-employed EITC claimants
in that area. In 2009, this represents about 600,000 people. From Chetty et al. (2013), this
measure is available for all 3-digit zip codes from 1996 to 2009. In Appendix A, we explain how
we convert zip-code-level information to the county-level.
In additional regressions, we consider three outcome variables representing the absolute
number of EITC claimants, namely the number of self-employed claimants near the kink point
(the numerator of the main outcome), the total number of self-employed EITC claimants (the
denominator) as well as the total number of non-self-employed claimants.
Institutional data. We combine the county-level data with institutional data on the State
EITC from 1996 to 2009, as well as institutional features such as refunds not being granted to
workers without children, or negative tax credits not being paid out. We take this data from
the NBER TAXSIM database.10
County-level demographic data. To run balancing tests, as well as to control for pre-
treatment characteristics of counties, we use county-level data on population, employment as
well as average wages. Data on employment and wages are taken from the Quarterly Census
of Employment and Wages (QCEW), whereas population data are taken from the county-level
population statistics provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
3.2 Descriptive statistics
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the main variables of interest. Because in one of our
research designs we only use counties that straddle a state border, we separately report statistics
for border counties.
10 See Feenberg and Coutts (1993) for a documentation.
10
Overall, the outcome variables as well as the regressors of interest strongly increase over
time. The ﬁrst two panels show the evolution of the State EITC. We ﬁrst consider a dummy
that equals unity if a county is located in a state with a top-up rate, and zero otherwise. Over
the sample period, the share of counties in states with top-up rates increased from 11.5% to
44%. Likewise, the average top-up rate across all counties increased over the same period. Due
to the large share of zeros, it only amounted to 1.6% in 1996, whereas it increased to over 5%
in 2009.
Panels 3)-5) display the mean and standard deviation of our outcome variables. The share
of self-employed EITC claimants near the kink point corresponds to the bunching measure used
in Chetty et al. (2013). The variables displayed in Panels 4) and 5) represent the denominator
and numerator, respectively, of the bunching measure. In addition, Panel 6) reports the total
number of EITC claimants per county.
To compare border counties with all counties, we additionally report population and labor
market statistics for the year 2004. According to these statistics, border counties do not diﬀer
in their demographic and economic structure from non-border counties. From 1,184 border
counties, we construct a dataset of 1,308 border county pairs, whereby a county that straddles
multiple counties in a neighboring state is part of multiple county pairs.
3.3 Descriptive evidence on top-up rates and income manipulation
The descriptive statistics in Table 1 show that both the top-up rate as well as the extent of
bunching increases over the sample period. In a next step, we provide evidence on how both are
related. We use the sample of border pairs and pay particular attention to the timing of raises
in the top-up rate. We exclude from the sample the few county pairs in which the top-up rate
decreased (55 pairs).11 In addition, if a county pair experiences several changes over the sample
period, we only include the ﬁrst change.
As in Figure 1 in the introduction, we are interested in the time trends in bunching in coun-
ties that experience a raise in the EITC compared to those where the EITC remains constant.
Within each pair, we consider as treated the county that is located in a state with a change
in the top-up rate and as control the county located in a state without a change. If top-up
rates were to have an eﬀect on income manipulation, following a raise in the State EITC in the
treatment group, we would expect to see an increase in bunching in the treatment but not in
the control counties.
To provide more systematic evidence for a response in bunching, we estimate an event study
equation of the form
ycpst =
3∑
k=−4
αk × 1[t=t∗+k] +
3∑
k=−4
βk treats × 1[t=t∗+k] +X′stγ + δt + εcpst, (1)
whereby we consider the period beginning 4 years before the raise and running until two years
11 In our main analysis in Section 5, these county pairs will be included.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
All counties Border Counties
Mean SD Mean SD
1 Top-up dummy (1 if state has a top-up rate, in percent)
1996 11.5 32.0 13.1 33.7
2000 22.8 42.0 25.7 43.7
2004 26.3 44.0 29.5 45.6
2009 43.8 49.6 46.6 49.9
2 Top-up rate (in percent)
1996 1.60 5.94 2.17 7.58
2000 2.59 6.03 3.00 6.48
2004 3.14 6.99 3.71 7.61
2009 5.51 8.34 6.03 8.77
3 Share of self-employed EITC claimants near the kink point
1996 5.04 1.55 5.00 1.61
2000 7.18 2.99 7.08 3.13
2004 8.50 3.98 8.29 3.96
2009 9.27 4.68 8.97 4.53
4 Self-employed EITC claimants
1996 817 2,755 753 2,149
2000 866 3,235 826 2,957
2004 1,187 4,309 1,108 3,982
2009 1,434 5,004 1,326 4,782
5 Self-employed EITC claimants near the kink point
1996 54 328 52 264
2000 91 572 99 702
2004 143 751 138 773
2009 194 902 178 904
6 Non-self-employed EITC claimants
1996 4,714 13,244 4,458 12,659
2000 4,734 13,430 4,507 13,054
2004 5,006 13,135 4,736 12,768
2009 5,371 13,336 5,054 12,895
Population, 2004 93,320 302,015 93,581 260,604
Unemp rate, 2004 5.69 1.82 5.67 1.87
Empl rate, 2004 94.31 1.82 94.33 1.87
Average wage, 2004 28,805 6,141 28,909 6,219
Counties 3141 1184
County pairs NA 1308
States 51 49
Notes: This table reports descriptive statistics for the main variables of interest for selected years. The top-up
dummy equals one if a county lies in a state with a top-up rate. The column on the left reports the statistics for
all counties in the US, while the column on the right only reports the statistics for counties that straddle a state
border.
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after. The subscripts c, p, s and t refer to county, pair, state and time respectively. We choose
as base period the year before the raise, i.e. t∗ = −1. Our coeﬃcients of interest are βk, which
represent diﬀerential changes in bunching between the treated and untreated counties within a
pair p relative to the base year. To control for time trends that are common to all counties, we
include two distinct sets of ﬁxed eﬀects. The ﬁrst set, 1[t=t∗+k], controls for average time trends
before and after a raise in the top-up rate, regardless of the year in which the raise occurred.
Because within our sample period of 14 years the raises occur in diﬀerent calendar years, we
additionally control for year ﬁxed eﬀects δt.
12 The year ﬁxed eﬀects ensure that the response to
a raise in 1996 receives the same weight in the estimate of βk as the response in, say, 2008. We
also control for time-varying features of the tax code (Xst), namely whether the refund depends
on the number of children, and whether a positive refund is given if a person's tax credit exceeds
his/her tax liability. The error term εcpst captures all determinants of the outcome that are not
explained by the regressors in the above estimating equation.
Figure 5 displays the estimates for βk. Before the raise in the top-up rate, the estimates are
close to zero and statistically insigniﬁcant. This is consistent with the parallel pre-trends shown
in Figure 1. After the raise, we ﬁnd signiﬁcant positive eﬀects on bunching in the treatment
relative to the control counties. A raise in the top-up rate increases the degree of bunching by
half a percentage point, which amounts to 5% of the mean in 2009.
While these results provide strong evidence of tax ﬁlers responding to changes in top-up
rates, there are endogeneity concerns that prevent us from interpreting these results as causal.
The same economic factors that aﬀect a state's decision to raise its top-up rate could also directly
inﬂuence bunching. Despite the parallel pre-trends, we may not be able to appropriately control
for these factors in the above regression. In the following sections, we address such endogeneity
concerns by using a border pair design. In addition, we deﬁne here an event as a raise in the
top-up rate, such that our estimates reﬂect the impact of an average raise. In the next Section,
we are able to quantify the marginal eﬀect of raising the top-up rate by 1 percentage point.
12 This approach  controlling for leads and lags as well as year ﬁxed eﬀects  is similar to the one used by
Jäger (2016).
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Figure 5: Bunching before and after a raise in the top-up rate.
Notes: This graph displays the coeﬃcient estimates of βk in Equation (1). The speciﬁcation includes year ﬁxed
eﬀects and controls and is estimated on a sample restricted to counties straddling a same state border. The
reference category is the year before treatment. The vertical line represents the period zero, i.e. the year before
treatment.
4 Main Analysis - Empirical Strategy
While the event study shows an increase in income manipulation following a raise of the state top-
up rate, there are several endogeneity concerns preventing us from interpreting these estimates
as causal. In this section, we describe our identiﬁcation strategy, which relies on a comparison
of neighboring counties that are exposed to diﬀerent EITC top-up rates.
4.1 Empirical model
To quantify the eﬀect of the EITC top-up rates on income manipulation, we consider an empirical
model of the form
ycpst = α+ β top-upst +X
′
stγ + FE(p, s, t) + εcpst. (2)
The outcome y in county c, which is located in pair p and state s, at time t is regressed on the
top-up rate in state s at time t. We control for time-varying state-level features of the EITC
(Xst), namely whether the refund depends on the number of children, and whether a positive
refund is given if a person's tax credit exceeds his/her tax liability. In addition, we condition
on ﬁxed eﬀects along several dimensions  pair, state, time, as well as combinations of these
dimensions.
The error term εcpst captures all the remaining determinants of the outcome. To account for
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serial correlation as well as cross-sectional correlation in the error term, we cluster the standard
errors at the county- as well as the pair-level. In addition, we asses our inference through
permutation tests.
4.2 Identiﬁcation
Given that the top-up rates are not randomly assigned to states but chosen by state governments,
we cannot immediately interpret the estimate of β as causal. A causal interpretation requires
that there be no correlation of the top-up rate with the error term conditional on controls and
ﬁxed eﬀects,
cov(top-upst, εcpst|Xst, FE(p, s, t)) = 0. (3)
There are at least three challenges to a causal interpretation. First, top-up rates may be set
endogenously. A state government that expects a strong reaction of taxpayers to a raise in the
top-up rate may choose a lower top-up rate than a state expecting a weak reaction. A second
problem is economic shocks that aﬀect EITC eligibility as well as the choice of top-up rate. A
state that is hit by a negative economic shock may decide to raise the top-up rate to alleviate
the consequences for low-income families. At the same time the shock may lower incomes and,
thus, increase the number of households eligible for the EITC. Therefore, an economic shock
can result in a spurious relationship between tax refunds and income manipulation.
A third challenge is diﬀerential time trends in income manipulation and top-up rates. As
shown by Chetty et al. (2013), knowledge about the EITC schedule substantially varies across
areas and over time. Initially, in some areas, tax ﬁlers seem to have no knowledge about the ﬁrst
kink point being income-maximizing, while in other areas there is a high concentration of tax
ﬁlers with a taxable income around the kink point. Over time, as the knowledge of the EITC
spreads, areas with initially zero bunching eventually catch up with those areas with a high
degree of bunching from the outset. Unless appropriately controlled for, the estimated eﬀect of
top-up rates on income manipulation may reﬂect those diﬀerential time trends rather than a
causal eﬀect.
Border pair design. To circumvent these challenges, we apply a border pair design, whereby
we compare neighboring counties that straddle a state border.13 Taxpayers with the same pre-
tax income are eligible for diﬀerent top-up rates on either side of the border. This setting has
quasi-experimental character, as it allows us to compare the change in income manipulation in
treated counties that experience a raise in top-up rates to changes in very similar control counties
where the top-up rate remains unchanged. The border pair design diﬀers from a conventional
panel estimator in the deﬁnition of the control group. In the panel estimator, the control group
is a weighted average of all other counties, whereas in the border pair design, each treated county
13 Similar approaches have been used by Dube et al. (2010) to evaluate changes in minimum wages in the US,
and by Lichter et al. (2015) to estimate the impact of government surveillance in East Germany.
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is assigned its neighbor as a control county. To the extent that neighboring counties are more
similar than a particular county and the weighted average of all other counties, the neighboring
counties provide a more suitable control group.
We implement the border pair design with three distinct sets of ﬁxed eﬀects.
Pair and year ﬁxed eﬀects, FE(p, s, t) = δp + δt. In the ﬁrst model, we condition on
year and pair ﬁxed eﬀects, which restrict the identifying variation to within pairs over time. A
positive estimate of β indicates that a widening of the gap in top-up rates within a county pair
leads to a widening of the gap in the outcome. These ﬁxed eﬀects help us to overcome the ﬁrst
of the three challenges. The pair ﬁxed eﬀects control for the average top-up-rate diﬀerential in
each pair and, thus, absorb any variation in states' diﬀerential setting of top-up rates.
Pair and year ﬁxed eﬀects and pair-speciﬁc time trends. While useful as a starting
point, the two-way ﬁxed eﬀect model with pair and year ﬁxed eﬀect can yield biased estimates
if county pairs diverge in their time trends, which have been shown to be present for bunching
(Chetty et al., 2013). To address this challenge, we additionally include pair-speciﬁc time trends
in the regression. In that case, the coeﬃcient β is identiﬁed oﬀ deviations from the time trend
within a pair.
Pair-by-year ﬁxed eﬀects, FE(p, s, t) = δpt. In a more demanding speciﬁcation, we include
pair-by-year ﬁxed eﬀects, which absorb all average diﬀerences in observable and unobservable
characteristics between years within each county pair. Restricting the variation in that way is
useful to exclude that the estimation of β is confounded by local economic shocks or diﬀerential
time trends between pairs. Take, for example, a pair that is hit by a negative shock that
coincides with a change in top-up rate in one of the counties and directly aﬀects the level of
bunching. Neither the pair nor the year ﬁxed eﬀects would account for that shock. However, the
pair-by-year ﬁxed eﬀects absorb such shocks, which raises the plausibility that the identifying
assumption (3) holds.
To understand how β can be identiﬁed on top of pair-by-year ﬁxed eﬀects, it is instructive
to use as reference point a model with separate time and pair ﬁxed eﬀects. In that model, we
exploit variation in top-up rates within pairs over time. A slightly more restrictive model would
be one with pair-speciﬁc time trends, which exploits variation within pairs over time on top of
the time trends. Our model with pair-by-year ﬁxed eﬀects goes yet another step further and
allows for year-pair-speciﬁc economic shocks. It is possible to identify this model because the
top-up rates as well as the outcomes vary within each pair. In the ﬁxed-eﬀect estimator for β,
each pair-year combination receives equal weight. We no longer use variation within pairs over
time, but rather use variation within and across pairs after diﬀerencing out any pair-speciﬁc
shocks.
Identifying variation Table 2 displays the amount of variation, measured by the standard
deviation, in the most important variables for diﬀerent samples as well as for diﬀerent ﬁxed
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eﬀect speciﬁcations. Column (1) displays the variation for all counties, whereas Columns (2)-(4)
display the variation for border counties only. In the border pair sample, some counties appear
more than once if they have more than one neighbor in a diﬀerent state. Going from left to
right, one can see that the amount of variation gets reduced as more ﬁxed eﬀects are added.
However, even after controlling for pair-by-year ﬁxed eﬀects, there is still substantial variation in
top-up rates as well as the outcome variables. Figure 8 in Appendix B illustrate the relationship
between top-up rates and bunching for the border pair sample, after pair-by-year ﬁxed eﬀects
and state-speciﬁc characteristics of the EITC have been controlled for. The graph points to a
signiﬁcant positive relationship, which we will further explore in the following section.
Table 2: Variation in key variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Counties Border Counties Border Counties Border Counties
Top-up rates
SD 6.86 7.56 5.43 4.88
Top-up dummy
SD 0.44 0.45 0.33 0.29
Share of self-employed near the kink point
SD 3.83 3.75 1.89 1.42
EITC claimants, self-employed
SD 3956.62 3391.67 2299.95 2175.05
EITC claimants, non-self-employed
SD 13245.24 13029.56 8284.27 8238.79
Self-employed claimants near the kink
SD 684.01 686.86 504.16 460.22
Controls:
County FE No No No No
Year FE No No Yes No
Pair FE No No Yes No
Pair × Year FE No No No Yes
N 43967 36616 36616 36616
This table displays the variation,measured by the standard deviation, in the main variables with
various sets of ﬁxed eﬀect. The all county data set comprises of all counties in the US. The border
county da-taset consists of counties straddling a state borders only. Column (1) -(2) display the raw
standard deviations. Column (3) shows the residual variation after a transformation of separate year
and pair ﬁxed eﬀects. Column (4) shows the residual variation after a transformation of year-by-pair
ﬁxed eﬀects
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5 Results
In the following, we present our estimates for the impact of the state EITC along several be-
havioral margins. We ﬁrst present our main results for the border pair design, using diﬀerent
ﬁxed eﬀect speciﬁcations. In a further step, we analyze whether the response changed during the
Great Recession in 2008/9. In both analyses, inference relies on parametric assumptions about
the spatial and serial correlation of standard errors. To assess the robustness of our inference,
we perform permutation tests, which conﬁrm our main conclusions.
5.1 EITC refund rates and income manipulation
Table 3 presents OLS estimation results based on the regression model in Equation (2). We
consider three ﬁxed-eﬀect speciﬁcations, four outcome variables, and two treatment deﬁnitions.
Each entry is the result of a separate regression of the outcomes listed in Panels A)-D) on the
top-up dummy or rate. In Columns (1)-(3), the regressor of interest is a binary variable that
equals unity if a state has a top-up rate, whereas in Columns (4)-(6), the regressor of interest is
the top-up rate in percentage points (zero for counties located in states without a top-up rate).
Our main measure for income manipulation is the bunching of self-employed EITC claimants
within a $500-interval around the ﬁrst kink point of the EITC schedule. For each county, this
measure is computed as the number of self-employed EITC claimants within this interval divided
by the total number of self-employed EITC claimants. In Panels B and C, we separately estimate
the impact of the top-up rate on both components that make up the bunching measure. This
allows us to study whether the overall eﬀect is driven by changes in the number of people around
the kink point (numerator) or in the overall number of tax ﬁlers (denominator). Finally, in Panel
D, we also consider as outcome the number of non-self-employed claimants. If we found an eﬀect
of the top-up rate on this variable, this would be indicative of knowledge eﬀects and labor supply
responses rather than manipulation of taxable income.
Eﬀect of the state EITC on bunching. In Columns (1)-(3), we only consider changes in
the top-up rate along the extensive margin. The coeﬃcient β̂ = 0.365 in Panel A, Column (1),
means that when a state introduces a top-up rate, bunching increases in a treated county in that
state by 0.365 percentage points relative to the neighboring county in a diﬀerent state, where the
top-up dummy remains unchanged. This eﬀect amounts to 4.4% of the mean level of bunching in
2004, as well as 19% of a within-pair standard deviation in bunching. The estimated coeﬃcient
is statistically signiﬁcant at the 10%-level. In Column (2), when we condition on pair-speciﬁc
time trends, we ﬁnd a similar point estimate, although the estimate is less precise and no longer
statistically signiﬁcant. In Column (3), our most conservative speciﬁcation, we condition on
pair-by-year ﬁxed eﬀects, based on which we obtain an even larger point estimate of β̂ = 0.492,
signiﬁcant at the 10%-level. These results suggest that tax ﬁlers respond to the introduction
of a state EITC with a higher share declaring an income closer to the revenue-maximizing kink
point.
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While these results provide a ﬁrst indication of an eﬀect, it should be noted that the eﬀect
is driven by changes in a limited number of states. Over the sample period, only 14 states
introduced a top-up rate. Within a county pair, the identiﬁcation comes from switches in the
dummy from zero to one, which can only happen once per county over the sample period. In
Columns (4)-(6), in contrast, we identify the eﬀect oﬀ changes in the top-up rate along both the
extensive and the intensive margin.
In the model with separate pair and year ﬁxed eﬀects, shown in Column (4), we ﬁnd no
statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect of an increase in the top-up rate on bunching. However, once
we condition on pair-speciﬁc time trends or pair-by-year ﬁxed eﬀects, the eﬀect is large and
statistically signiﬁcant. For a within-pair standard deviation in the top-up rate (sd = 5.43),
bunching increases by 5.43 × 0.023 = 0.12 percentage points, which is around 6.6 percent of a
within-pair standard deviation in bunching.
Eﬀect on the number of self-employed claimants. The results shown in Panel A represent
the eﬀect of an increase in the top-up rate on the share of EITC claimants whose income is close
to the EITC kink point. This share consists of two components, namely in the numerator the
number of self-employed tax ﬁlers close to the kink point and in the denominator the total number
of self-employed tax ﬁlers. A positive eﬀect in Panel A indicates that the numerator increases
more than the denominator, leading to a higher share. To assess the relative contributions of
both, we separately consider the eﬀects of the EITC in Panels B and C. In Column (1), we ﬁnd
that the introduction of a top-up rate increases the number of tax ﬁlers near the kink point
by 222, which is larger than the mean number in 2004 or 2009. At the same time, it leads to
an increase in the total number of self-employed EITC claimants by 893, which is around 75%
of the mean in 2004. In Column (4), we estimate that a one-percentage-point increase in the
state EITC raises the number of self-employed claimants near the kink point by 8.6 (1.7% of
a within-pair standard deviation) and increases the total number of self-employed claimants by
36.5 (1.6% of a within-pair standard deviation). With both regressors, the eﬀect size increases
when we condition on pair-by-year ﬁxed eﬀects. To sum up, the top-up rate increases both the
numerator and the denominator with the former increasing more than the latter.
Eﬀect on non-self-employed EITC claimants. Finally, in Panel D, we estimate the impact
of the EITC on the number of non-self-employed claimants. This group is interesting because
it has little scope for manipulating their declared taxable income. Rather, any eﬀect here is
indicative of a change in labor supply. The evidence on this channel is mixed. We ﬁnd large
and statistically signiﬁcant results when we use the top-up dummy as regressor, but small and
statistically insigniﬁcant results when we use the continuous measure of the top-up rate. These
results provide suggestive evidence for labor supply eﬀects, although the marginal eﬀect of an
increase in the top-up rate on bunching appears to be driven by other channels. This is not
surprising, given that, in general, it is (more) diﬃcult to adjust labor supply at the intensive
margin  i.e. the number of hours worked  due to frictions in the labor market. Yet, it
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is possible that a higher state EITC increases labor supply at the extensive margin which we
cannot rule out but also not directly test with our data. An alternative explanation for this
eﬀect could be knowledge eﬀects (Chetty et al., 2013). The introduction of a state EITC is a
salient event that triggers public discussions. Therefore, taxpayers may be more aware of the
introduction of a state EITC compared to the raise of an already existing state EITC.
5.2 The impact of top-up rates before and during the great recession
While bunching had been steadily increasing up until 2007, there has been a signiﬁcant drop in
2008 and 2009, while at the same time the average top-up rate continued its upward trend. A
possible reason for these developments is the Great Recession in 2008/09, during which states
expanded their EITC top-up rates, while the increase in unemployment decreased the number
of eligible households (see Figure 6).
To assess whether the impact of the top-up rate changes with the Great Recession, we
estimate a regression with a full interaction of the top-up dummy or rate with dummies for the
pre- and post-Great-Recession period.
ycpst = β1 top-upst × 1[t<2008] + β2 top-upst × 1[t>=2008] +X′stγ + δpt + εcpst. (4)
The ﬁrst term is an interaction between the top-up rate and a dummy that equals one in the
pre-crisis years, while the second term is an interaction with a dummy that equals one from 2008
onwards.14 Our results point to a large and signiﬁcant eﬀect before 2008, although while we
ﬁnd no consistent eﬀects in 2008/9. In Column (1), the eﬀect on bunching in 2008/9 is negative,
which is the case because the denominator  the total number of self-employed claimants 
reacts more than the number of claimants close to the kink point.
5.3 Assessing inference through permutation tests
While the border design facilitates the estimation of a causal eﬀect by providing clear treatment
and control counties, it also complicates statistical inference. The error terms can be correlated
across space as well as within counties over time, which can lead to an underestimation of
standard errors, and an under-rejection of the null hypothesis of no eﬀect (Bertrand et al.,
2010). Moreover, in the border pair design, some counties are part of multiple pairs, such
that their errors are mechanically correlated. As a ﬁrst step, to account for correlations in the
error term, we applied to all estimates a two-way clustering procedure at the county- as well as
pair-level. However, clustering may not eliminate all systematic correlations of the error terms.
To assess the statistical signiﬁcance of our estimates without relying on assumptions about
clustering, we additionally perform permutation tests for the four main outcomes. In these tests,
we ﬁrst obtain an empirical placebo distribution of estimates that would occur under the null
hypothesis of there being no eﬀect. In a second step, we compare our estimates to the placebo
14 While these two dummies are multicollinear, it is possible to include these interactions in the regression
because we do not include the dummies on their own.
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Figure 6: Top-up rates and bunching, 1996-2009
Notes: This ﬁgure shows the average level of bunching in percent (left axis), as well as the average top-up rate.
Each dot represents the average across all counties within a given year.
distribution and obtain a empirical p-value that describes the probability of obtaining a result
that is at least as extreme as ours.15 In a conventional case, namely one in which a treatment
is assigned once, the placebo distribution is obtained by repeatedly randomizing the treatment
across observations and estimating the same model in each replication. The complication in our
case is that top-up rates within states are path-dependent. States do not randomly set a top-up
rate every year, but rather adjust the rate of the previous year. To account for path-dependency,
we therefore randomize over 14-year paths in top-up rates. In each replication, we randomly
assign each state a path for its top-up rate and estimate the model.
Figure 7 displays the cdfs of the placebo distributions based on 5,000 replications, as well
as the z-scores of our estimates (vertical lines) from Column (6) in Table 3. The horizontal lines
describe the 90-th percentile of the placebo distribution. Statistical signiﬁcance at the 10%-level
requires that the intersection of both lines be located South-East of the placebo distribution.
This is the case for the outcomes displayed in Panels A-C, where the empirical p-values are 0.055,
0.014, and 0.027, respectively. For the outcome in Panel D, namely the total number of non-
self-employed claimants, the p-value is 0.128, which means that this estimate is not statistically
signiﬁcant at the 10%-level.
These results conﬁrm the inference drawn from the two-way clustering approach in Table 3.
Raises in the top-up rate signiﬁcantly increase bunching near the kink point, which is the result of
an overproportional increase in the number of claimants with an income close to the kink point.
As before, we ﬁnd no statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on the total number of non-self-employed
EITC claimants.
15 This procedure follows Kennedy (1995) and Chetty et al. (2009).
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Figure 7: Permutation tests
Note: Each panel displays the cumulative density function (cdf) of the empirical distribution of
the estimates based on Equation (2) with pair-by-year ﬁxed eﬀects under the null hypothesis of a
zero eﬀect. Each distribution is based on 5,000 replications. The empirical p-values indicate the
likelihood of obtaining an estimate that is at least as extreme as the one in our main analysis
under the null hypothesis of no eﬀect. The smaller the p-value, the less likely a result is to
emerge by chance.
24
5.4 Discussion
Overall, our results support the hypothesis that higher tax refunds create a greater incentive
for income manipulation and, therefore, can trigger behavioral responses along several margins.
While our data do not allow us to fully distinguish between false declaration of taxable income
and labor supply responses at the extensive or intensive margin, our results suggest that both
mechanisms are important. Our ﬁnding that a raise in the top-up rate increases the extent of
bunching at the kink point suggests that there are adverse responses to the state EITC. If the
eﬀect was exclusively explained by labor supply responses  especially at the extensive margin
 it would be unlikely that we ﬁnd an eﬀect on bunching. For labor supply responses along
the extensive margin, we would rather expect that the numerator and denominator are similarly
aﬀected, i.e. the additional number of claimants near the kink point is proportional to the
total additional number of claimants. In contrast, the positive eﬀect on bunching suggests that
the additional number of claimants at the kink point is much larger relative to the additional
number of claimants. While not a proof, these over-proportional changes at the kink point to
false declarations of taxable income and potentially to labor supply adjustments at the intensive
margin.
Nonetheless, the eﬀects on the total number of self-employed EITC claimants suggests that
not all behavioral responses to the state EITC can be classiﬁed as adverse. One of the central
aims of the EITC is to provide recipients with an incentive to work. The results in Panel Cof
Tables 3 and 4 and to some degree also the results for non-self-employed workers in Panel D
suggest that these incentives work. A higher top-up rate induces more people to work, and
this additional labor supply appears to be spread out along the income distribution rather than
concentrated at the kink point.
6 Conclusion
Virtually all public policies trigger behavioral responses by their recipients. In this paper, we
document and quantify such behavioral responses for the Earned Income Tax Credit, the largest
welfare program in the US. Using data on the extent of bunching at the ﬁrst kink point of the
EITC schedule, and exploiting variation in state-speciﬁc tax refunds over time, we ﬁnd signiﬁcant
behavioral responses along several margins.
First, we document that higher EITC top-up rates increase the number of self-employed
people who claim the EITC. This eﬀect can either represent an increase in (self-employed) labor
supply, or a change in tax ﬁling behavior. LaLumia (2009), for example, shows that raises in the
tax refund increase the likelihood that potential recipients declare their self-employed income.
Second, we show that a raise in the EITC top-up rate leads to an over-proportional increase
in the number of self-employed claimants who declare an income close to the income-maximizing
ﬁrst kink point of the EITC schedule. The increase in this number is considerably larger than
that of the total number of self-employed EITC claimants, in turn leading to more bunching at
the kink point. This result points to a signiﬁcant behavioral response, namely that tax ﬁlers
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choose to declare their taxable income or their labor supply or both in a way that maximizes
their EITC receipt.
These results suggest that the EITC, as any other welfare program, triggers behavioral
responses. To policymakers, some of these  for example labor supply at the extensive margin
 are desirable, while adverse responses, such as false declaration of taxable income, are not.
While our results for the eﬀect on bunching suggest that income manipulation is an important
response, we would require more detailed data to fully disentangle labor supply eﬀects from
manipulation of taxable income through false declaration. For future work, we are hoping that
such data become available.
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A Converting zip-code-level data to county-level data
The dataset by Chetty et al. (2013) provides data at the level of 3-digit zip codes. Because
the border pair design requires information at the county-level, we convert the data from the
zip-code to the county level. The dataset mainly consists of absolute numbers, such as the
number of EITC claimants in a given zip code. If a zip code comprises more than one county,
we divide the absolute numbers evenly across all counties within a ZIP code. For example, if
there are 1000 claimants in zip-code A and A consists of two counties we assign each county
500 claimants. If, on the other hand, a county is part of more than one zip code, we assign this
county the sum of the absolute numbers. If the zip code that cuts through a county also covers
another county, we split the absolute numbers between these countries before adding up within
counties. For example, if zip codes A (1,000 claimants) and B (500 claimants) are completely
contained in county X, we assign county X 1,500 claimants. If, however, zip code A also covers
another county while B is fully contained in X, we assign county X 500 claimants from A and
500 claimants from B.
For the 3,141 counties in our dataset, we apply the ﬁrst method  split the numbers
between counties within a zip code  to 1,179 counties. For another 1,960 counties, we apply
both methods, namely we split numbers between counties as well as aggregate numbers within
counties. The remaining two counties coincide with the zip codes.
B More on identifying variation
Figure 8 illustrates the relationship between state-speciﬁc top-up rate (horizontal axis) and the
degree of bunching (vertical axis) in a binned scatter with ten equally sized bins on each axis.
The graph controls for state-speciﬁc characteristics of the EITC, as well as pair-by-year ﬁxed
eﬀects. The regression line corresponds to the regression coeﬃcient in Table 3, Panel A), Column
(4).
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Figure 8: Bunching vs. top-up rates
Notes: This graph displays the relationship between the share of self-employed at the ﬁrst kink point of the EITC
and the state speciﬁc top-up rates in a binned scatter, whereby each variable is divided in ten equally sized bins.
Both variables have been demeaned by pair-by-year ﬁxed eﬀects, and we control for state-level features of the
EITC.
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